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______________________________________________________ 
The war that ravaged Liberia between 1989 and 2003 had myriad causes and 
belligerents, but there can be little question of the demographic cohort which provided 
the manpower’ for the war machine: youth. In particular, young, disconnected Liberians 
became easy recruits to the conflict’s warring factions, as they sought a sense of 
importance and independence away from the cultural background that marginalized 
them. Building on qualitative field research in Liberia, this article bridges its primary 
case study with theory and secondary data, to examine the threat of post-war re-
marginalization and disengagement of youth in the country. The article argues that 
economic reintegration programmes have not addressed issues of youth empowerment 
directly enough, and that targeted political and social engagement strategies from a 
vertical and horizontal integration perspective would be more effective in the re-
engagement of youth in civilian life.  
________________________________________________________ 
 
‘Liberia is in danger of losing a generation of young people.’ This statement was heard 
throughout the country’s 14-year civil conflict (1989–2003), but is worryingly still heard 
today, as post-war recovery efforts have largely failed to truly engage this demographic 
cohort in social and political life. This article investigates the nature of this danger, how 
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it has happened, and what the potential solutions may be. Using data from a two 
months’ qualitative field research (March–May 2009), the article presents the status of 
youth marginalization, integration and engagement.  
The field research was conducted in 47 communities and towns in six of Liberia's 
15 counties, including Monserrado (the country’s most wealthy and populous county), 
Bong (one of the most war-affected regions), Sinoe (one of the remotest) and rural 
Gbarpolu (Liberia’s newest and also one of its poorest counties). Through a partnership 
with the international non-governmental organisation (NGO), Mercy Corps, the field 
research involved interviews and focus group discussions with 249 young people and 
96 elders across the country.1
Overall, the article argues that many of Liberia’s young people are disconnected 
from broader society, and in some cases are being actively marginalized. Further, 
although young people are essentially searching for a greater sense of importance, the 
economic empowerment and reintegration programmes which the international 
community have been pushing are failing to provide this. In order to respond to this 
challenge, from a vertical and horizontal integration perspective the article explores the 
possibility of socio-political engagement of youth in civilian life. Finally, it investigates 
how the ultimate goal of giving young people a degree of social importance can be 
targeted effectively. 
 While many of these interviews were centred around 
Mercy Corps programming and will not directly be cited, the indirect nature of 
questioning allowed for a clearer picture of the context to be developed, and were 
pivotal to the development of this discourse. This research was supplemented by 
interviews conducted at the national and local level with key ‘stakeholders’ in the 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Moreover, some of the research's most 
valuable lessons were found in informal environments such as on the football field, 
where natural discussion built upon familiar relationships to enable subtle but significant 
nuances behind the responses to be uncovered. 
 
Youth and Violence in Liberia 
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The term ‘youth’ is an ambiguous one. In Liberia, youth is commonly defined by the 
government chronologically, to denote any individual aged 15 to 35. Others have 
ventured alternative, and at times contradictory, definitions of what it means to be a 
‘youth’, often based on functional characteristics or the local cultural context, such as 
participation in traditional rites of passage ceremonies.2
 
 The importance of such 
ceremonial initiations into traditional societies in Liberia was highlighted by 
anthropologist George Harley as early as 1941:  
No boy or young man is considered a member of the tribe unless he 
has been initiated by suitable rites into the company of his elders. The 
adolescent must undergo certain ordeals to prove that he is ready and 
worthy to take on the responsibilities of citizenship – until then he does 
not count.3
 
 
This is not only the case for boys. Many Liberian girls 'do not count' until 
they have been initiated into traditional Sande societies, the female equivalent 
of the Poro societies Harley spoke of. Until then, they may be denied the 
opportunity of marriage, as well as other steps considered valuable to the 
individuals' social development. It is also Harley's turn of phrase that will provide 
the basis of this article’s definition of youth: a period when the individual 'does 
not count'. Our definition therefore represents a social status more than an age 
bracket; a status with connotations of marginality, when the individual  boy or 
girl  is not yet accepted by others as an adult. 
Youth participation in Liberia's conflict was largely fuelled by this marginalized 
status, and by a disconnection from broader society. Young people in Liberia have 
typically had little independence or agency over their own lives, and even less influence 
in the community around them. They were traditionally under almost complete control of 
their elders until they graduated into ‘adulthood’. Many young people did not achieve 
this transition until they were well into their thirties. Dissatisfied with their enduring 
‘immaturity’, many young people used the opportunity of war to escape from their 
repressive traditional surroundings and seek some sense of independence and 
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personal emancipation.4 As one ex-combatant explained: '[The war was] all because of 
dissatisfaction. Because those men have been marginalised and abused… at the end of 
the day, any man can come along and say, "we have a mission".'5 Youth participation 
was therefore shaped more by opportunity than by bloodthirsty motivation.6
This marginalization-fuelled participation was further encouraged by 
disconnection from society – those individuals with least responsibility to, or acceptance 
from, others were most likely to see war as a viable option, as their violent actions did 
not bring condemnation from anyone they felt ‘mattered’. As in Sierra Leone, young 
Liberians were even specifically targeted for this reason, as they were deemed the 
demographic element most ‘detachable’ from the existing structures of the state and 
civil society.
  
7 As a long and chaotic conflict in which soldiers frequently changed sides, 
accurate data detailing the demography of the war's participants at any given time is 
unavailable.8 However, studies of Liberia's ex-combatant population, and countless 
personal accounts from the war's belligerents, victims and bystanders, lead us to the 
common but nevertheless disheartening inference that the war was fought mainly by 
youth. While the mean age of the 102,193 combatants who registered in the Liberia’s 
formal disarmament process was an only marginally youthful 25.3,9  this cohort included 
some 11,353 children, the youngest of whom were only seven years old.10 Child fighters 
were recruited by all protagonist groups, including President Charles Taylor’s ‘Small 
Boys Unit’, and constituted as much as 37 per cent of some factions’ armies.11
Many of these individuals took part in Liberia's formal Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programmes, implemented by 
the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the National Transitional Government of Liberia. 
DDR processes as far as they are conceptualized by the international community, 
intend to provide opportunities for former combatants to go through an ‘identity’ 
transformation process so that they can move from the ‘norms’ of fighting to civilian life. 
Each phase of DDR has its own critical challenges, and impacts on each other, and 
considering that DDR is often planned and implemented in terms of a linear process, 
the goal and activities of ‘reintegration’ do not go any further than an aspiration of 
‘reinsertion’ into society. In most DDR cases, the reintegration element seems to be an 
elusive objective, which is largely due to limited funds available for such a huge task. Of 
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the initial US $13.5 million that had been budgeted by UNDP for the DDRR Trust Fund 
in Liberia, for instance, $10.2 million was spent on the first two phases of the process.12 
This well-documented funding shortfall left minimal funds available for formal 
reintegration activities, which Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem define as, 'the 
process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, 
economic and political life of (civilian) communities.'13 In fact, only 42,395 former 
soldiers took part in reintegration programmes, accounting for less than half of those 
who were formally disarmed.14
Arguably, an even more significant failure of many DDR programmes is that the 
critical question of ‘reintegration into what’ is never asked.
 
15 War has a huge impact on 
society's structure, and DDR programmes must respond dynamically to this. Most 
relevantly, armed conflicts can 'loosen the reins of society over youth' as they 'redefine 
their own societal roles.'16 In other words, through war, young people gain new 
experiences of independence as fighters or from enhanced societal and household 
roles. Women in particular (who accounted for as much as 22 per cent of total 
participants in formal disarmament17) are often afforded significantly smaller societal 
roles after conflict. As one female fighter explained to Irma Specht: ‘We first were 
fighting men with our guns, now we have given up our guns, but we still have to fight 
men.'18 A senior politician from the Liberian Ministry of Youth and Sports recognized 
that the power structure had 'radically changed,'19 though many elders were refusing to 
recognize this. Failure to accept changes in social structure can be problematic. A 2008 
conflict mapping exercise made clear that unless practical strategies for youth 
participation in social and institutional arrangements were prioritized, there remained a 
'strong likelihood' of a reversion to violence, and that '[t]he "genie" of Liberian youth will 
not, willingly, be put "back in the bottle".'20
Our field research indicates that young people in Liberia are, in many cases, 
being forced back to their pre-war traditional roles. Whether this will result in youth 
participating in future conflicts is a speculative issue. However, a study for the US 
Institute of Peace (USIP) found that about a third of urban and rural ex-combatants said 
they could envisage a reason to fight again.
 
21 It is also important to remember that often 
it only requires a minority to start a war. Taylor’s rebel incursion into Liberia in 1989 was 
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started with only 168 people.22 Another worrying aspect is that many young people 
continue to see violence as the only ‘bargaining chip’ that works. One senior politician 
explained that the drafting of the 2005 National Youth Policy was only pushed forward 
after youth riots in Monrovia in 2004. He also observed that police station burnings 
across the country provides further evidence that youth are willing to use violence in 
order to be listened to.23
 
  
Liberia’s Young People – are they Disconnected? 
 
War had a huge effect on Liberia’s young people. A combination of violence, 
displacement, and chaos provided youth with a perverse upbringing, and removed 
many of them from typical civilian life. As the previous section highlighted, disconnection 
is closely related to marginalization, which in turn encourages recruitment. A UN 
Population Fund (UNPFA) study conducted among nearly 7,000 Liberian households 
found that those most disconnected and vulnerable were less likely to seek out social 
services and have peer support, leaving them susceptible to other, less favourable, 
influences.24 One member of the Margibi Youth Secretariat explained the difficulty of 
many young Liberians in engaging with any element of post-war civilian society: 'If I was 
born in the 1980s, what kind of experience do I have? All I have is AK-47 experience.'25
It is well established in the literature that uniting former child soldiers with family is seen 
as the best way to guarantee reintegration.
  
Many young people, particularly ex-combatants, continue to feel distanced from society, 
and having lacked everything from family support to school and extra-curricular 
activities, they remain angry and frustrated with what civilian society has to offer. 
26 Surveys of ex-combatants in Liberia have 
suggested that good relationships with the family would prevent a return to conflict.27 
Parenthood has also proved to be important in connecting former combatants with 
civilian life. The USIP study suggested that more women in particular would consider 
rejoining armed groups if they did not have to care for families. Similarly, a former 
fighter now living in Monrovia, explained: 'I was 17 when I joined the rebel group. Now I 
am a grown man with children. Why would I listen to [a potential recruiter] when I can 
hear my daughter at home crying?'28 
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While some new relationships, like marriage, can be built after conflict, ironically 
family is also one of the greatest casualties of war. In 2008 as many as 31.4 per cent of 
girls aged 10–15 and 29.9 per cent of boys in Liberia still had neither parent in the 
household.29 While James Pugel’s 2007 What the Fighters Say survey showed family 
social networks to be important to ex-combatants across the board, they are often 
removed in conflict through displacement. Over half of the population was displaced at 
some point during the war, and Pugel’s ex-combatant study found that 42 per cent of 
respondents had not returned to their home communities since the war. For the 
particularly poorly-integrated group – the non-DDRR participants – the figure was 56 per 
cent. An extensive literature examines rural combatants staying in urban areas after 
war. In Liberia 60 per cent of Monrovia-based ex-combatants have never returned to 
their home communities.30 One former fighter from outside Monrovia who, like 
thousands of others, stayed in the capital at the end of the war explained the impact of 
displacement on his disconnection from local society, even to the extent that he was no 
longer a citizen: 'In our different counties we have family. We have our business. We 
have our home. That’s what makes us citizens… here we have nothing.'31
Life without family and peer support can exaggerate a sense of marginalization, 
and will also remove the positive elements of peer pressure such as the condemnation 
of violent action. While most ex-combatants surveyed by Pugel felt that they did not 
have any problems of acceptance, only 66 per cent believed that their communities 
perceived the general population of ex-combatants favourably. In particular, those 
former combatants who never took part in DDRR programmes (classified by Pugel as 
the ‘hard core’ fighters), were the most cautious; 46 per cent believed that their 
communities were 'watchful or distrustful' and over 10 per cent believed community 
members saw them 'with fear.'
 
32 One former fighter explained the impact of this social 
distance: 'It’s hard to trust anyone… people don’t see us (ex-combatants) as good 
people in society.'33
While this is typically seen as an issue affecting ex-combatants, one member of 
the Bong Youth Secretariat was keen to point out that this disconnection affects all 
varieties of youth who were unable to engage with normal social institutions, like school, 
during the war; 'We are all war-affected youth,' he explained.
 
34 As the war came to an 
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end in 2003, almost 60 per cent of females and 40 per cent of males had never been to 
school,35 including 68 per cent of 15–20 year-olds.36 This disconnection is closely 
related to marginalization, as those pushed to the margins may either involuntarily 
become disconnected, or consciously remove themselves from the society they feel to 
be marginalizing them. The second of these proved to be particularly relevant to ex-
combatants in Liberia, who were very conscious of their insignificance in society. 
Another former fighter living in the outskirts of Monrovia, explained, 'I don’t see no 
concern for us.' The day before this interview he and other amputees had buried 
another former combatant in a bag because no-one would take him away. He did not 
want to die like that.37 This accorded with a view expressed by the founder of the 
National Ex-combatant Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI), also an ex-combatant. He 
explained that former fighters often do not feel like a part of broader society because 
they feel they have nothing to offer other people.38
While individual agency and participation in decision making can help young 
people feel important and engaged in society, the next section examines the extent to 
which many young people feel marginalized. Beforehand, however, it is important to 
introduce two primary concepts used here for the analysis of youth’s role in the post-
conflict context: horizontal and vertical integration. While extensive literature has 
examined the concepts of horizontal and vertical social capital to understand community 
cohesion,
  
39 in this article the terms ‘horizontal and vertical integration’ are used to 
describe the individual’s level of engagement within these (usually invisible) societal 
characteristics. Horizontal integration therefore is best recognized through friendships, 
engagement in associations, and interconnectedness. Vertical integration involves the 
engagement of the individual in the more visible vertical institutions of social capital 
such as decision-making, both at community and national level. The horizontally and 
vertically integrated individual finds true citizenship within civilian society, and through 
this acceptance becomes one of its ‘joiners’, helping to ‘tighten’ the social fabric, and in 
doing so building social capital.40 It can be argued that if either horizontal or vertical 
integration are missing, the individual may find his or her identity outside of the realm of 
civilian society. This is likely to be reflected by his or her choice of actions, which may 
work outside of or even against the civilian institutions which form that society.  
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Missing the Point: The Failure of Economic Reintegration Programmes 
 
The need to deal with the ‘youth problem’ in Liberia is being recognized. Liberia’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy acknowledges youth as one of the six crucial areas for 
attention, and much of the DDRR Trust Fund has been spent on youth. While there are 
exceptions, the vast majority of the money that materialized was spent on economic 
reintegration. Justification for the importance of jobs after war has been well-
documented in the literature and will not be examine in-depth here. 41 Nor will this 
section attempt to evaluate all of Liberia’s economic reintegration programmes, as their 
successes and failures have been extensively appraised elsewhere.42 Rather, the point 
is that an exclusive focus on economic reintegration strategies is misguided. The World 
Bank's World Development Report 2007 recognizes that in countries such as Liberia, as 
many as 10 per cent of the male working-age population will go through such 
programmes. Given their size and reach, then, it is crucial that they are tied in with 
broader development goals.43
Former combatants interviewed across the country almost universally explained 
that they wanted a job more than anything else. A troubled ex-combatant in his early 
20s from Lexington, Sinoe County, had never returned to his home county of Nimba 
after the war, and finding a job was his first priority. However, after speaking for a while, 
he was asked: 'But why do you want a job?' While one might have expected him to 
highlight the importance of money and material wealth, he replied, 'To be someone in 
the future.'
  
44
It is no original proposition that young people see gaining skills as more than just 
economics but about finding a place in society.
 This response was echoed by young people interviewed across the 
country – ‘to be someone’. Employment is not just a means to subsistence or wealth, 
but has a much more important role in providing status. The ‘goal’ is not the job, but 
what it entails – status as well as money. 
45 It has also been acknowledged in 
research on Liberia; Steve Archibald and Edward Mulbah suggest that, '[h]aving a 
sustainable livelihood is to have a stake in society and to have a means whereby a 
young person can measure his or her social worth.'46 A 2005 report prepared for the UN 
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Children's Fund (UNICEF) suggests that the low absorption capacity of local economies 
was one of the main causes of the non-sustainability and failure of the post-1997 
demobilization process. It also said 'no miracles' should be expected from the Liberian 
labour market in the near future.47  In 2008, 72 per cent of the 1,400 ex-combatants who 
participated in one survey identified themselves as unemployed.48
Decimated post-war economies are ill-equipped to absorb new workers, however 
skilled or unskilled they may be. This denies social worth as well as income. In fact a 
sense of social worth may deteriorate further as expectations are unfulfilled (over 90 per 
cent of ex-combatants who participated in reintegration training believed that the 
training they received would ensure their sustainability for many years to come
  
49). One 
ex-combatant living in central Monrovia explained that, for most ex-combatants, the 
UN's skill training reintegration programme had provided little alternative to the 
combatant lifestyle: 'The programme was fine, but after the programme, what was the 
impact so that they don’t go back to where they were before?'50 Mats Utas contends 
that, '[e]ducating youth in skills for which they find no use only forges a class of 
educated, but disgruntled youth, again deceived by the world.'51
This is not even to mention the huge costs associated with skill training 
exercises. An International Labour Organization (ILO/IPEC) report estimated the costs 
of training packages for former child fighters to be between US$1,200 and US$ 4,100 
per trainee.
  
52 A better proposition may be to arrive at the goal of social worth through an 
alternative, and more direct, route. If youth participation in conflict was a means of 
'strategic upward mobility aiming at obtaining respect and status,'53 programming could 
target this issue of respect and status more directly.  Hill, Taylor, and Temin’s Would 
You Fight Again? survey concluded that there is a need to improve the ‘soft side’ of 
DDRR programmes, as reconciliation processes and efforts to repair relations between 
ex-combatants and their families and communities could produce greater returns than 
economic agendas.54
This is not to say that economic capacity building programmes have no role in 
reintegration activities; they can be vital for the normalization of life, easing societal 
 Similarly, inclusion within decision-making frameworks can go a 
long way to creating a sense of importance, as well as ensuring that real needs are 
responded to. 
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reintegration and increasing social interactions. The emphasis here is that job creation 
programmes cannot do everything. A 2009 investigation found that they have had 
minimal impact in Liberia,55 and they may have allowed issues vital to community 
cohesion such as youth marginalization to be overlooked. Reintegration is a, 
'continuous, long-term process',56
 
 and more attention should be paid to potential 
transformation efforts than short-term, ‘expedient’ training programmes.  
Vertical Integration 
 
Krishna Kumar referred to some young people as the, 'voiceless children of war.'57 In 
many cases, children and young people are not voiceless in war; war is their voice – 
when young people feel that they are not listened to along traditional lines of 
communication, they seek alternatives. A peaceful mechanism is needed for listening to 
that voice. Dialogue can provide, 'safety valves for pent-up pressure',58
 
 and such 
participation can have hugely beneficial long-term impacts on national development, as 
young people become ‘stakeholders’. As highlighted earlier, this should not be seen as 
an issue of ‘concession’ to youth in a zero-sum scenario, or solely based around 
lowering socio-political instability risks, but as a new potential for partnership. 
Giving Young People Their Voice 
 
Democracy relies on citizens having a voice, and the government being able to respond 
effectively to that voice. It also makes them stakeholders in the system, which can be 
particularly important for ex-combatants or other young people who feel they may have 
lost political influence since the war. Including young people in decision-making early in 
life helps produce common goals, which support social cohesion and solidarity, and as 
has been previously demonstrated, promote ability and willingness to engage in the 
same systems later.59 Although 54.6 per cent of the 1.3 million registered voters for the 
2005 election were ‘youth’,60 this irregular participation through voting has failed to 
satisfy many young people. One ex-combatant living in Congo Town explained, 'I am 
not represented – there is no-one coming here [to talk to me]… then I will know I am 
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represented.'61
A 2005 survey conducted with 173 youth groups from all 15 of Liberia’s counties 
found that in the previous year, while 61.3 per cent had collaborated with other 
Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) or NGOs, only 31.2 per cent had done so with 
the district or town chief, 28 per cent with the office of the mayor, and 21.9 per cent with 
the County Superintendent.
 Over half of youth group members interviewed across the country 
wanted to be politicians when they grew up, many suggesting that this was because 
there was no way of influencing politics from the outside.  
62
As long as civil society is provided with no more engagement than advocacy, 
those individual participants, particularly young people, will continue to be seen as a 
destabilizing threat – as ‘warriors’ rather than a contributors to community and state 
advancement. One representative from a Gbarnga-based local civil society NGO, DEN–
L, incisively summarized the situation: 'We have created a lot of demand.'
 These statistics highlight a great flaw in the post-war 
development of civil society in Liberia; while the international community has supported 
bottom-up advocacy, Liberia does not have the institutions to listen and respond.  
63
 
 For Liberian 
civil society – and the political system as a whole – to be robust, leadership from 
presidential to community level needs to start working on the supply. Supply does not 
simply mean ‘getting done what is demanded’, but being able to respond through 
dialogue to explain ‘realities’ and work together. As the voice of formerly silenced 
groups increases, particularly restless youth, structures need to be built to incorporate 
and respond to those voices. 
Listening to That Voice 
 
Half-way democracy does not work, and has statistically proven to be far more prone to 
conflict than true democracy.64 Citizens must feel that their demands are being 
responded to, or at least must be informed of the reasons for delays or the inability to 
respond. If leadership fails to do this, citizens are, 'likely [to] attribute the lack of visible 
improvements to a lack of political will.'65 One ex-combatant explained that, 'They must 
show concern for you before you can trust them.'66 If working within the system does not 
get any form of response, young people may seek to get their demands satisfied by 
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working outside the system. One facilitator of a training programme for ex-combatants 
symbolically described the justification for many young people's violent actions: 'If a 
mother promises her child a bike, the child will expect to receive a bike. The child will 
keep asking, ‘Ma, where’s my bike?’ every day, every week, until she receives it. If 
mother does not buy her child a bike in the end, the child will just take it.'67
The problem of youth disengagement must be comprehensively addressed. As 
Sommers points out, 'acceptance is not enough. Urban youth must be actively, 
consistently, and positively engaged.'
  
68 Liberia requires a truly two-way network of 
communication between national and local government and leadership, and young 
people. A World Bank study suggests that, 'a well-placed series of strategic and 
coordinated activities can help manage expectations, alter perceptions, build public trust 
in state institutions and repair citizen-state relations.'69
This involves regular and periodic consultation and work towards a common 
goal. The youth-run West Africa Youth Network has worked to create this periodic 
consultation between young people and governments at a national and international 
level. The Programme Director of the Liberian chapter explained that, '[w]ith these 
periodic consultations, our voices have started to be heard.' He explained that as a 
lobbying group, opinions are seen as the ‘flavour of the day’ and not given much 
attention, but, '[w]hen these views become consistent, governments become obligated 
to listen as they realise the youth are serious.'
 In other words, the creation of 
direct lines of communication at community and national level can increase the ‘supply’ 
that the DEN–L representative spoke about. By creating more direct lines of 
communication, ‘supply’ can respond to individual young people. 
70 Once the two can work together, young 
people’s faith in the government is likely to increase, and they can derive satisfaction 
from the feeling that their opinions are being taken into account.71
It requires a planned and systematic structure, rather than the ad-hoc procedures more 
typical of post-conflict environments. In order to prevent the most disconnected and 
marginalized youth being excluded (which many NGO programmes inadvertently do), 
true participatory involvement of all young people is required, rather than just cosmetic 
engagement with youth. This is an important issue to keep in mind as the next section 
 Furthermore, it can 
generate ownership, making young people greater stakeholders in peaceful society. 
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investigates the other essential step to countering marginalization and disconnection: 
horizontal integration. 
 
Horizontal Integration 
 
Potential inclusion in decision-making is not enough to fully engage many young people 
in society – they are only truly vertically integrated when they understand and engage 
with what is available to them. Some individuals are more predisposed than others to 
participate72
So while earlier sections showed that many young people are disconnected, the 
peer realm offers an opportunity for ‘reconnection’. As young people develop their own 
identities, they 'take cues' from trends in their communities.
 and it is often those most disconnected that lack this predisposition. Elite 
and mainstream youth tend to dominate young people’s representation in civil society. 
Although youth is not a homogenous or egalitarian population, it is a shared identity in 
Liberia and offers possibly the best opportunity from which to build a cooperative and 
bridged society. One can see this shared identity everywhere from ‘Youth for the Lord’ 
T-shirts, to ‘Youth Don’t Fight’ billboards plastered across the capital. As the first goal of 
the drafted National Youth Policy recognizes, ‘youth’ offers a potential unifying factor 
while other identities such as ethnicity provoke further potential for division.  
73 The majority of these cues 
come at the peer level. Thus widening the realm of peer-level interaction with different 
groups of young people can foster a sense of importance, engagement and inclusion in 
civilian life. It is the first step in a wider engagement with civilian life and vertical social 
capital. Social capital theory suggests that too strong bonds within groups, without 
corresponding bridges between groups, can be dangerous.74
Building such relationships can reduce the social distance between individuals, 
and between the individual and society at large. This ‘tightens’ social capital, supports 
peer accountability, identity formation, and the condemnation of violence, as well as 
 This article suggests that 
the initial stages of horizontal integration are simply focused on ‘reconnecting’ 
disconnected individuals with civilian life. For those truly disconnected, bonding 
between different youths is already a bridge between civilian and non-civilian life, and 
without this step, further bridging may not be possible. 
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supporting psychosocial recovery on the individual level.75 It thereby makes conflict less 
likely, as the enemy cannot be made ‘not like us’, a tactic commonly used by war-
makers. Paul Richards explains that, 'the greater the social distance between warrior 
and victim the easier it becomes to kill for an idea.'76 Experience from Liberia suggested 
a recognition of this; as one Liberian explained to Philippa Atkinson that, 'for war not to 
come back in we have to love one another and work hard for the country.'77
Research has shown that young people in post-conflict environments are 
particularly vulnerable to peer pressure.
  
78 This peer pressure can be negative, but 
‘positive peer pressure’ can be critical to young people’s survival and resilience in 
situations of conflict and displacement.79 Horizontal integration aims to ensure that this 
peer-pressure is as positive as possible, and to bridge divides through a wide network 
of support and engagement once the individual is ‘reconnected’ with civilian society. 
Young Liberians across the country highlighted the role of building new peer 
relationships in helping to form identities. Motorcycle unions across West Africa have 
been presented in the literature as hugely valuable in this way.80 A representative from 
the management of the Bong Motorcycle Union explained how its young riders 
benefited from association within a new civilian peer group: 'We demobilise [the ex-
combatant] so that he forgets his past.'81
However, as in other parts of Africa, there is low engagement in associational life 
by young people in Liberia. While some have suggested that this is because young 
people do not feel that associations could offer them much,
 Arguably one of the reasons for motorbike 
riders being relatively more empowered was their membership of an association. Such 
associations can further tighten bonds, while bridging people who had no such 
relationship before.  
82 a representative of the ex-
combatant-run NGO, NEPI, suggested that this was because young disconnected 
individuals, particularly ex-combatants, felt that they could not offer anything to 
associations, or to the wider community. He explained that, '[t]he issue of self identity 
and recovery is very important. Once you understand what you can offer to society, you 
will find opportunities available.'83 Similarly, upon being asked, “Why did the war 
happen?” one former fighter now living in Weala, Margibi County, immediately 
responded: “Because we never knew the importance of ourselves.”84 This issue of 
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identity and social importance is a large part of horizontal integration – it helps young 
disconnected people see themselves as having an important place in a wider social 
network, even if it is only through recognition from friends. When it comes to rebuilding 
one’s identity after conflict, the World Development Report 2007 explains that, 'a young 
person’s identity emerges through recognition from those who count.'85
 
 It may be 
difficult initially to engender confidence through elders, government, and decision-
makers, who marginalized and disconnected youth are more sceptical of, therefore 
bridging among youth is essential to give young people confidence in themselves and in 
the civilian institutions around them.  
How to ‘Use Them’ 
 
The concept of using peers to engage others is not new. One USAID good practice 
document suggested ‘tapping into’ youth groups and associations to reach out to 
alienated peers,86 and Marc Sommers proposed using youth trainers to get through to 
others.87 This theory has been the basis of NEPI’s success. One representative 
explained why they are accepted both as youth and as ex-combatants: 'We know how 
they feel – we were there before.'88 In other words, one method of building horizontal 
social capital is simply by giving young people more opportunity to do what they do best 
– build relationships. This can be particularly beneficial to former combatants to develop 
new civilian relationships. An impact evaluation of the UNICEF-run child soldier 
reintegration programme in Liberia suggested that child and youth groups set up had 
'remarkable potential' at helping young people improve their self esteem and ability to 
deal with daily problems.89 Disconnected youths can benefit in a multitude of ways just 
by being ‘reconnected’. While the primary goal of the youth life skills programme that 
was evaluated across three Liberian counties as part of this research was, of course, 
life skills education, the programme’s greatest benefit, by far, turned out to be its role in 
reintegration. Just by bringing together young people who would not normally meet, 
young people developed friendships and a sense of belonging. One participant 
explained how the programme, 'made us together,' while another explained how new 
interactions, 'really brought love among us.'90 Moreover, one member of the Margibi 
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Youth Secretariat even likened the value of peer support to that of religion when he 
explained: “In order to make a non-believer a believer, first you need to make them your 
friend. If you make them your friend, you can do anything.”91
As well as just increasing the quantity of interactions, effective horizontal 
integration can benefit from new dynamics of interaction. A USAID document suggested 
building relationships between youth and the wider community through mentorships and 
internships.
 
92 Another approach could be to change the dynamics of the relationships 
so that other people rely on young people, rather than them relying on others. Such 
peer-based relationships benefit both participants, not just the ‘beneficiary’, and can 
help people form new identities and grow in self-esteem as others place trust and 
respect in them. The Country Director of the international NGO, ‘Right to Play’, 
explained that sometimes it was the programme’s facilitators who benefited even more 
than the ‘beneficiaries’, particularly when the facilitators wanted to escape from a bad 
reputation: 'Some people had been in the black books of society. When they are seen 
as doing something for the children, they are respected.'93
These dynamics can be shifted at a higher level by government and the 
international community. While academics and practitioners have recommended giving 
youth groups increased independence in programme design and facilitation, it continues 
to be seen as 'revolutionary' for many NGOs and funders to entrust faith in young 
people and youth groups when it comes to financial investment.
  
94 A leading 
representative of the Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY) explained how few 
international or national institutions in Liberia have truly collaborated with young people 
in this way, despite its highlighted benefits. 95
Horizontal and vertical integration are therefore connected in a multitude of ways, 
and must be addressed together. Once a horizontal voice is built up loud enough, it 
 Young peoples’ associations are one 
potential area where youth’s independence could be supported, and while membership 
is relatively low, it is growing. A denser associational life among youth could help tighten 
both horizontal and vertical social capital, as it would offer a more succinct and direct 
demand (rather than just many voices shouting). It would also offer a more manageable 
and productive means of consultation and supply by the government, and could provide 
new dynamics of interaction with elders and authority. 
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should be able to attract recognition vertically. Similarly, vertical integration needs to 
reach all through bridged horizontal integration, or it could exacerbate a sense of 
marginalization to those left out, or cause the creation of too strong bonds within 
groups. Supporting this will not only be of benefit to the youth and elders already 
discussed, but a responsible and positive youth population can have a crucial role 
acting as a bridge between child and adult populations and as role-models for the 
former.96
 
  
Conclusions 
 
As young people provide the ‘gunpowder’ rather than the ‘spark’ for war, ultimately the 
best way to prevent their participation in conflict is to prevent conflict altogether.97
Many of the war’s young participants in Liberia lacked either the horizontal or 
vertical integration that this article has examined. Youth marginalization in most 
traditional communities minimized vertical integration, as young people had no 
engagement in decision-making activities, and horizontal integration deteriorated ever 
more as the war dragged on. Although many of the estimated 15,000–20,000 child 
soldiers who took part in the first conflict from 1989 to 1997 were forced into 
participating, few of them found any ‘connection’ to the civilian society around them 
afterwards, and then willingly took part in the second round of violence, but this time as 
‘youth’ rather than children.
 
Nevertheless, a focus should also be made on preventing a healthy youth population 
from becoming that gunpowder in the first place, and on using their energy and idealism 
for fostering peace.  
98
Equally importantly, although war was seen by many observers such as Utas as 
a form of ‘strategic upward mobility’, few of the war’s young foot soldiers found the 
wealth or lasting power they were looking for. This article therefore suggests that, as 
theory predicted, Liberia is in danger of ‘losing’ its youth (again) to armed groups who 
can offer them a sense of importance and personal emancipation. One young Liberian 
explained that, “the people that would join [militia groups] are those with no hope in 
 Youth disconnection and marginalization in this way are 
both very serious and interrelated threats to security.  
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society.”99
There is of course no single silver bullet solution, but rather the situation requires 
a holistic new approach to youth, from a societal, policy and programmatic perspective. 
Young Liberians must truly be engaged as partners; and as a resource for the future, 
rather than as a threat. Efforts to engage young people vertically must be genuine, and 
must make concerted efforts to incorporate a demographic group sceptical of the 
insincerity of their elders. Face-to-face institutions in Liberia have proved to be much 
more trusted by young people,
 If young people do not find 'hope', or other responsible opportunities to 
develop in Liberia’s civilian society, they may find options that are irresponsible.  
100
In addition to participation within those vertical institutions, true bonding of 
disconnected youth within civilian society requires engagement at the horizontal level. 
New relationships among youth can help them learn how to interact with other people, 
experience non-violent excitement, and galvanize enthusiasm for civilian society.
 so governmental institutions must adapt to be just 
that. Those institutions must genuinely offer participation, rather than just token 
representation, and those periodic consultations must work on a multitude of levels, 
through associations as well as outreach with individuals. 
101
While the necessary alternative of socio-political integration of youth that this 
article proposes may be seen as a form of ‘reculturing’, Bastiaan De Gaay Fortman saw 
this step as just as important an activity in post-conflict recovery as reconstruction, 
restructuring and reconciliation.
  
This process can be valuable informally, and through engagement in formal 
associations, which can provide a site for new identity and sense of belonging.  
102 Mary Douglas argues that it is important not to give 
culture too much respect if it discriminates against the common interest of peace.103 If 
‘local culture’ marginalizes a group up to the extent that they are willing use violence in 
rebellion, that ‘culture’ must adjust to guarantee peace. In Liberia war was, 'no 
aberration but the implosion of a defective system.'104
 
 This defective system therefore 
needs to be addressed. 
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